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The Necessity of Implementing a 
Public-Health Approach to 
Humanitarian Demining 
Clearing mines is expensive, and demining programs 
usually consume funding before reaching the task of 
mine removal. The authors suggest ways to make 
demining more practical, effective and economical us-
ing a "public-health" approach. 
by Daniel H. Wolf, President, and 
Steven Bannazel, Publications 
Director, Terra Segura 
lntemotionol 
Introduction 
Landmines are an epidemic, yet 
unlike other programs fighting epi-
demics, humanitarian demining does 
not conscienriously apply public-
health techniques. National mine-
clearing pro jeers conform ro inflexible 
military models that maximize cenrral 
control while stifling local initiative. 
Inrensive mine-at-a-rime clearing ef-
forts, though urgent in heavily traf-
ficked areas, are applied across the 
board, dissipating demining resources. 
This makes reducing risks across large 
areas and populations impossible, re-
sulting in continuing and unnecessary 
deaths from unaddressed mine fields. 
C learing every mine field is be-
yond the world's demonstrated will-
ingness to expend capital. Speeding 
reclamation and reducing casualties 
within existing resources requires more 
emphasis on overall risk reduction, 
more efficient methods and technolo-
gies and increased incentives for pri-
vate action. 
Public-health programs do this by 
balancing what is best for individuals 
with what is best for all. Expensive 
acute care, such as caring for rhe sick 
during cholera epidemics, is the 
smaller parr of rhe solution; the larger 
part is generalized threat reduction 
(e.g., providing reliable, potable wa-
ter systems). The goal is to achieve the 
highest society-wide health benefit for 
the available funds, which are always 
insufficient. 
A public-health approach in 
demining would optimize efforts to 
greatly reduce risk in concentrated ar-
eas where civilian exposure is extreme 
and needs are urgent (e.g., clearing 
paths to wells and schools), and mod-
erately reduce risk over very large ar-
eas (e.g., locating and marking mine 
fields without clearing them, conduct-
ing mine awareness education andes-
tablishing lasting community response 
teams). 
The wider perspective of public-
health programming stresses coordi-
nation and cooperation with other 
organizations to cut costs for activi-
ties such as victim rehabilitation, eco-
nomic development and employment 
generation. Not only are overall risks 
and casualties reduced for given our-
lays, bur communities and their 
economies also recover faster. 
Humanitarian demining is more 
than reducing postwar injuries. It is 
also meanr ro build rhe conditions for 
a stable peace and a robust prosperity. 
Improving the whole public health is 
as imporrant as eliminating individual 
threats. 
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Why Conventional De mining Is 
So Expensive 
Manual demining is rhe gold 
standard for near-100 percent re-
moval. However, the inherent risks 
eviscerate individual productivity. 
C hecking for booby traps, clearing 
vegetation, probing carefully, digging 
up numerous suspicious objects and 
rotating crewmembers to deter stress 
and boredom requires multitudes of 
low-ski lled detection personnel. With 
more than 3,000 personnel, for in-
stance, the Cambodian Mine Action 
Center (CMAC) cleared only 10 sq 
km a year out of some 3,500 affected 
sq km. As a consequence, labor costs 
are astrono mical. 
Bureaucratic facrors also increase 
costs. Centralization robs the tooth of 
clearing activities by concentrating 
excessive resources in the bureaucratic 
tail. Relying on peacekeeping forces 
and national armies for leadership, the 
organ iza tional models for rhese 
projects, not surprisingly, are military. 
Though appropriate for combat, when 
applied to mine clearance, this model 
is inefficient, nor economical, stifling 
ro local initiative and adaptation, and 
slow ro respond to new or newly-dis-
covered beneficiary needs. Experimen-
tation is directed from above, innova-
tion must run a gauntlet of policies 
and doctrines, and local responses to 
local conditions must pass through 
levels of bureaucratic filters. 
Furthermore, most projects suf-
fer all the typica l problems of systems 
with third-parry funding. A handful 
of distant agencies disburse most 
demining money, so these donors 
(plus army headquarters when the 
deminers are acrive-dury soldiers) be-
come the projects' true cl ients; the 
people living in mine-infested areas are 
simply powerless beneficiaries. Priori-
ties of donors and national officials 
often crump rhe needs of de miners and 
mined communities. 
Accountability is the reason usu-
ally given for bureaucratic structures, 
but small spending for actual 
demining is the reality, irrespective of 
justification for high overhead. The 
Bosnia Mine Action Center, despite 
enormous spending since 1995, has 
nor even finished its preliminary task 
of mapping all mine fields, much less 
accomplished sizable clearance. Even 
mine fields around Sarajevo remain 
unmarked, a fact that was tragically 
proven last year when two children 
were killed instantly and a third died 
slowly within earshot of her parents 
whi le Norwegian People's A id 
deminers tried frant ically to rescue her. 
H owever, with more than 3,000 per-
sonnel, CMAC cleared only 10 sq km 
per year our of some 3,500 affected 
square kilometers. 
W hen accountability is de-em-
phasized ro allow greater efficiency, 
however, abuses occur. The Uni ted 
Nations for years praised CMAC as a 
model of effectiveness and 
"susrainability." Recent exposure of 
nepotism , ineffi ciency and misfea-
sance in CMAC (specifically, the clear-
ing of land for the commercial use of 
former Khmer Rouge officers) led to 
funding cutoffs and contraction. Some 
who have worked with LAO-UXO in 
Laos allege that it would collapse with-
out expatriate advisers. LAO-UXO 
may be more robust than that, but an 
exodus of expatriates would likely 
cause foreign donors to lose confi-
dence, causing LAO-UXO to shut 
down from lack of funds. 
A recent U.N. policy review, not-
ing the prevalence of "poor manage-
ment compounded by inappropriate 
and unsupporrive U.N. administrative 
and budgetary mechanisms, lack of 
forward planning and disputed lines 
of authority," recommended that the 
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Uni ted Nations "not be involved in the 
direct implementation of mine action 
acrivi ties." 1 
Even the most efficient programs 
are expensive. Total monthly expenses 
for the Afghanistan Mine Action Pro-
gram, for example, run $800 (U.S.) 
per deminer, only $ 150 of which is 
actual wages; the rest is equipmem, 
transport, food accommodations, in-
surance, medical support, etc. Total 
costs for the program's five expatriate 
supervisors reach $250,000 each.2 The 
unfortunate result of all these factors 
is that clearance costs more than most 
agricultural land is worth. This elimi-
nates one of the most powerful incen-
tives for investing in demining- the 
lure of positive returns on investments. 
Private landowners will not invest in 
land clearance unless rhey expect to 
make a profit in order to support their 
families. Likewise, a government min-
istry in a poor country will not invest 
in clearing large areas if it cannot ex-
peer positive net revenues, even con-
sidering the economic and social value 
of avoiding injuries and deaths. It must 
invest irs limited funds in growth and 
development, not simply spend in 
ways that may produce net reductions 
in coll ective economic well being. 
Improvements in Planning 
Demining 
T he picture is not entirely dismal. 
Coordination between military and 
civilian organizations has improved, 
and the United Nations has responded 
to critiques by beginning to focus on 
the coordination among, rather than 
the actual operations of, NGO s. 
Additionally, in an attempt to 
march needs with available resources, 
demining planners now apply triage 
to lands (i.e., prioritize them accord-
ing to risk and necessity and autho-
rize "tr eatm ent " according to these 
priorities). Obviously, acure threats 
such as mined schoolyards and water 
sources are treated immediately even 
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at great cost. Ideally, public infrastruc-
ture and rransportation are cleared 
next, then private infrastructure and 
productive lands, and finally low-value 
lands such as pastures and wastelands. 
The desired treatments for these 
various levels of need have evolved into 
three accepted risk-reduction "treat-
ment levels." From the top, Level3 is 
complete clearing (the most expen-
sive), akin to acute care; Level2 is de-
marcation of mine field perimeters 
(meant to put mined land in a safe 
holding pattern while making the 
unmined surrounding land available); 
and Level 1 is an aspirin-like treat-
ment, generating general location data 
and impact information for planning 
purposes, accompanied by mine 
awareness training that is often inef-
fective. 
Unfortunately, funds are too lim-
ited in many cases even to clear the 
most critical areas, much less mark 
mine fields to keep people safely out. 
Even when funds are ava ilable, the 
middle level of care is largely unattain-
able because Level 2 surveys apply the 
same labor-intensive techniques used 
for clearance itself, which is very ex-
pensive, especially in densely vegetated 
areas. 
In order to make serious headway, 
overall performance must increase dra-
matically without expecting increased 
public funding. The challenge is enor-
mous, and responsible agencies must 
go beyond easy fixes-they must make 
substantial changes in their organiza-
tio n and procedures and bring along 
donors and affected constituencies in 
both mined and donor countries. 
Getting started requires three 
strategic responses: 
• adopting the utilitarian public-
heal th philosophy, 
• immediady implementing mea-
sures to improve performance within 
existing institutional constraints, 
• providing a several -year effort 
to create systemic flexibility, improve 
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options and transition demining in-
stitutions towards a true public-health 
demining system. 
The Ut1l1tanan Approach to 
Reducing Societal Threat 
Notwithstanding the humane 
concern underlying all public-health 
programs, economic rationality and 
practicality govern attacks on every-
thing from typhus epidemics to air-
plane crashes because it is impossible 
to protect everyone completely in a 
world with finite resources. 
To end a typhus epidemic, for 
example, officials divide funds and ef-
forts among acute care, programs of 
prevention and behavioral change, and 
construction of sanitation infrastruc-
ture. Similarly, to reduce airplane ac-
cidents, officials simultaneously pro-
mote safety in design, manufacture 
and operation. Attempting to eradi-
cate all flies that carry typhus at the 
expense of other variables would be an 
ineffective (and Sisyphean) strategy, as 
would spending all available funds to 
build a "perfect" airplane while leav-
ing flight operations unregulated. In 
both cases, working to eliminate a 
single risk factor results in more deaths 
than a strategy of risk reduction that 
is optimized but incomplete. 
Striving to achieve a perfect solu-
tion for a single aspect of public-health 
problems wastes resources. The fun-
damental premise is that the whole 
population is better off (i.e., stays 
healthier and lives longer) if all people 
are protected to some degree than if a 
few are protected completely. Instead 
of focusing resources on a small por-
tion of the population, public-health 
workers apply a significant proportion 
of their resources in a relatively thin 
layer over large groups, perhaps even 
entire populations. 
So it should be with demining. 
Every day, people and livestock stray 
into unmarked and unfenced mine 
fields, and every day, dozens of people 
... 
succumb to the odds they face there. 
Reducing aggregate threat levels (i.e., 
reducing the odds of encountering a 
mine in all populated areas) would 
reduce death and injury more than the 
present practice of expending almost 
all resources on eliminating mines 
completely in only a few places. This 
method would also contribute more 
to economic development, political 
stability and tax generation. 
Public-health programs and 
methodologies vary considerably by 
disease and social setting. Some meth-
ods are primarily epidemiological-
identifYing causes. Others are socio-
logical; (e.g., working to change hy-
giene habits) or public-works-oriented 
(building sanitary water and sewage 
systems to interrupt disease cycles). All 
programs share two goals: 1. to imple-
ment the most effective strategic at-
tack on the epidemic, in order to stop 
it in irs tracks and turn it around, and 
2. to maximize effectiveness per dol-
lar invested. 
Not coincidentally, the second 
goal flows from the first. Good pub-
lic-health programs exploit the weak-
nesses of their disease adversaries and 
reinvent themselves as they confront 
new conditions. Using tools from the 
fields of epidemiology, economics, 
sociology and political science, among 
others, programs analyze nor only the 
disease but also the social and techni-
cal advantages and impediments faced 
in the struggle against disease. 
Public-health officials are not ma-
gicians but pragmatists. They attempt 
to maximize organizational effective-
ness and optimize use of available re-
sources in order to minimize aggregate 
death and injury. This requires con-
stantly analyzing and tinkering with 
organ izational functioning; develop-
ing, resting and refining improvemems; 
integrating new technologies; and con-
tinually attending to stakeholders at all 
levels. Ignoring any single element 
threatens optimization efforts. 
• 110 • 
Immediate Practical Measures: 
mproving Performance Within 
:Xisting Constraints3 
Years of deminer debates and 
complaints prompt the following sug-
gestions: 
• Measure efficiently. Funding 
agencies increasingly understand that 
the true measures of demining efficacy 
are reduced casualty rates and in-
creased land available for safe use. 
Emphasis on mines cleared, in con-
trast, penalizes Level 2 surveys while 
rewarding the clearance of unimpor-
tant mine fields that are dense. 
• Freely share approaches, methods 
and knowledge. Successful companies 
and NGOs have expert knowledge; 
they should be included in planning. 
Voluntary standards and free exchange 
of information, though messy, will 
stimulate cooperation across the spec-
trum of demining organizations. 
• Promote local civilian involve-
ment in prioritizing and scheduling. 
Program managers believe, under-
standably, that they know how to set 
up demining projects best. However, 
local residents are the experts on many 
local matters. There is no substitute 
for eliciting unmediated local knowl-
edge and preferences on such issues as 
the relative values of land. 
• Attack Level 2 surveying with a 
vengeance. Level2 surveys only require 
that the mine fields be detected and 
marked. Mechanical detonators are 
more than adequate for this task. 
Combining detection and confirma-
tion (an explosion denotes both), me-
chanical detonators allow quick area 
coverage without exposing personnel 
to danger, thus increasing survey speed 
while reducing cost. (This topic will 
be addressed at length in a compan-
ion article in the next issue of this jour-
nal.4) Because dogs are difficult to de-
ploy ubiquitously, they should be used 
as complements to detonators in or-
der to increase the total area surveyed. 
• Emphasize tooth, not tail. Fund-
ing agencies need to remember that 
reporting does not clear mines. While 
accountability and unbiased measures 
of success are necessary, data gather-
ing and reporting should be second-
ary to aiding deminers in the field. 
Demining teams can be trained to 
collect and submit data in the ordi-
nary course of their activities. Bureau-
cratic operations must not swallow 
project budgets. 
• Encourage and reward innova-
tion. If their thoughtfulness is taken 
seriously, local personnel will feel more 
responsible for and committed to 
projects. 
• Procure equipment that is right 
for the conditions. The "toolbox" idea 
that many different technologies 
should be developed and deployed for 
different conditions is honored more 
in the breach chan in the practice. 
Rich-country military R&D has pro-
duced rich-country military machines. 
Building wonderful machines that 
deminers cannot afford ro buy and 
maintain is of little help. Successful 
technologies optimize price, utility and 
operating cost within the socioeco-
nomic circumstances of a country's use. 
Because labor is relatively cheap and 
capital is expensive in d eveloping 
countries, preferred equipment may be 
different from that favored in the de-
veloped world. 5 National inventories 
should allow deminers ready access to 
the best detector for the soil and logis-
tical conditions they face, and remore-
conrrol brush cutters should be made 
widely available in order to speed up 
one of the slowest steps in demining. 
Transition of Institutions: 
Relaxing Constraints and 
Enhancing Adaptive Response 
In the longer term, to better en-
hance economic rationality, it is pos-
sible to vary organizational fundamen-
tals such as: 
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• Decentralize and adopt appropri-
ate civilian management and methods. 
Centralization is often justified by the 
low sophistication of local personnel. 
Advanced training and education of 
local employees could remedy this, 
though initial expense would increase. 
The organizational model for public 
projects should migrate towards small 
teams that can operate quasi-indepen-
dently and foster team spirit. Field 
workers could then assume more re-
sponsibility, thereby reducing manage-
ment and coordination burdens. 
• Improve regulatory oversight. In-
dependent organizations, whether 
public or private, should be contracted 
for quality assurance and funded w rhe 
level required to assure quality regula-
tory oversight and public confidence. 
(Terra Segura International, the cor-
porate author of this article, has de-
veloped a phased turnkey pilot project 
implementing this concept.) One by-
product will be greater transparency, 
reducing the likelihood of serious tres-
passes. 
• Digitally link goods and services 
across complementary industries. Mines 
are intensely local problems, bur sup-
port and resources for their clearance 
are global. Electronic management of 
demining goods and services and ac-
quisition through organizations that 
possess logical relationships with the 
mine problem can increase efficiency 
while bearing new resources. 
• Promote the growth of mine-clear-
ance markets. The salvation of mined 
countries will truly begin when the 
private sector starts investing to 
remediare mined lands as a way to cap-
ture revenues from use. The above 
measures will create conditions for the 
safe growth of local land remediation 
markets. International insti tutions 
working through microcredit lenders 
can help capitalize local demining con-
tractors, as well as make grants and 
loans to their customers. As costs fall, 
more pnvate demining teams will 
spring up, enhancing competition, 
innovation, differentiation and spe-
cialization. Demand for demining ser-
vices will grow as it becomes profit-
able to reclaim more and more land, 
and more private capital will flow into 
clearing. International and govern-
mental agencies will be able to shift 
their primary focus to regulation, qual-
ity assurance and economic develop-
menr, benefiting victims and poor 
landholders. 
Conclusion: The Larger Benefits 
of a Public-Health Approach 
In mined countries, poverty is the 
rule, and devastation is both cause and 
effect. Most land has low economic 
value relative to land in rich countries, 
and expected revenues are small. This 
makes most demining economically 
irrational and therefore unsustainable. 
Mine clearance depends on philan-
thropy, a funding stream that is pres-
ently inadequate and possibly subject 
to erosion. Changing this picture will 
require careful but dramatic action. 
Better humanitarian demining is 
justifiable on the basis of faster casu-
airy reductions at lower cost. Bur the 
benefits go far beyond this. As 
demining costs fall and investments in 
land remediation increase, economic 
activity of all kinds will recover and 
expand. The result will be more pros-
perity and political stability, reduced 
reliance on economic assistance, fewer 
economic causes of conflict, and less 
need for foreign military interference 
and peacekeeping. • 
This article is based on a paper Mr. Wolf 
presented to rhe UXO/Counrermine Forum, New 
Orleans, April 9-12, 200 I . 
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